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STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN SERVICE NETWORKS 
UNDER PRICE AND SERVICE LEVEL COMPETITION 
 




Decentralized service providers specialize on contributing their core competency to an overall 
goal. This paper focuses on the strategic behavior of service providers within Service Value 
Networks. We present an abstract model as a formalization of a service value network. The model 
comprehends an auction-based mechanism design to allocate multiattribute service offers within 
the network and to determine prices for complex services. Furthermore we study the mechanism 
theoretically as well as on a simulation basis in order to analyze strategic behavior of service 




A novel service-oriented economy following strategies such as differentiation, customer-centricity 
and flexible business is observed in today's service markets. Previous ideas of static value chains 
are giving way to highly dynamic service value networks formed by many services from different 
specialized service providers. Companies employ differentiation strategies by shifting resources to 
focus on their core business. An example is Xignite3 that specializes on providing a broad catalog 
of financial Web services. Other companies such as Jamcracker4 provide platforms to foster a 
demand and supply match between service providers and service resellers that offer value added 
services to customers. In theory, the complex products or services could be produced by a single 
vertically integrated company. But in this case the company could not focus on its core 
competencies, having to cover the whole spectrum of the value chain. Additionally, it would have 
to burden all the risks in a complex, changing and uncertain environment by itself. This is why 
companies tend to engage in networked value creation which allows participants to focus on their 
strengths. At the same time rapid innovation in the ICT sector enabled promising opportunities in 
B2B communication supporting this trend. However, especially in complex and highly dynamic 
industries, forming value networks – especially business webs with their open structure – is more 
than an attractive strategic alternative. Prominent advocates of this new paradigm are [19, 12, 21, 
18]. Business webs bring together mutually networked, permanently changing legally independent 
                                                 
1 Forschungszentrum Informatik Karlsruhe (FZI), Haid-und-Neu-Str. 10-14, D-76131 Karlsruhe 
2 Institute for Information Systems and Management, Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Englerstr. 14, 76131 Karlsruhe 
3 http://xignite.com 
4 http://www.jamcracker.com/ 
The project was funded by means of the German Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology under the promotional 
reference “01MQ07012”. 
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actors in customer centric, mostly heterarchical organizational forms in order to create (joint) value 
for customers. Specialized firms co-opetitively contribute modules to an overall value proposition 
under the presence of network externalities. 
In our work we present an abstract model as a formalization of a Service Value Network. The 
model comprehends an incentive compatible auction-based mechanism design to allocate multi-
attribute service offers within the network and to determine prices for complex services. Incentive 
compatibility makes revealing the true type (service configuration and internal costs) a weakly 
dominant strategy for all service providers. Since incentive compatibility only holds for a one shot 
game, we study strategic behavior that might improve the SP payoffs. The strategic behavior is 
studied by means of a simulation-based analysis of two different strategies for service providers 
within Service Value Networks. We analyze two environmental settings, a price competitive 
environment as well as competition on basis of service levels. Based on our results we discuss 
strategic recommendations for service providers depending on how they are situated within the 
network. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a literature overview on path-based 
procurement auctions and mechanism design in general as well as concepts for trading different 
kind of services specifically. Subsequently, we proceed with the introduction of a formal model and 
a mechanism design for allocating and pricing of complex services. The strategic behavior 
regarding the two strategies deviating from the weak dominant strategy is then analyzed using a 
simulation approach. We conclude the paper with a summary and an outlook to ongoing research 
and open questions.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
The principles of mechanism design to coordinate self-interested participants in perusing an overall 
goal are introduced in [16]. These mechanisms mainly apply to auctions of one or multiple units of 
one good. Thus, the basic auction mechanisms are not suited for auctioning heterogeneous 
combined services such as complex services. Heterogeneous goods and bundles are usually traded 
in combinatorial auctions. Nevertheless, combinatorial auctions yield major drawbacks regarding 
computational feasibility that result from an NP-hard complexity. Computational feasibility implies 
a trade-off between optimality and valuable mechanism properties such as incentive compatibility. 
[1, 17] propose approximate solutions for incentive compatible mechanisms to overcome issues of 
computational complexity. Path auctions as a subset of combinatorial auctions reduce complexity 
through predefining all feasible service combinations in an underlying graph topology [4]. As a 
subset of combinatorial auctions, path auctions are introduced in [8, 13] and [2]. In their work, path 
auctions are utilized for pricing and routing in networks of resources such as computation or 
electricity. Application-related issues of auctions to optimal routing are examined in [6, 9] and [15]. 
All of these approaches deal with the utility services layer according to the service classification in 
[3, 5] and hence do not cover the problems related to elementary services and complex services. 
The strategy an agent follows when placing bids in an auction is induced by the mechanism’s 
properties. In incentive compatible auctions agents are incentivized to choose the strategy of 
revealing their true type. Incentive compatible mechanisms are firstly introduced and extensively 
investigated by [10, 11, 20]. Most of the research has been done with respect to truth-telling of 
prices and valuations. In the field of designing incentive compatible mechanisms, that induce truth-
telling of non-functional properties of goods or services in multiattribute auctions, a lot of 
investigation is still missing. Traditional approaches in the area of multiattribute combinatorial 
auctions are not quite suitable to enable the trade of composite services. Auctions for composite 
services are much more complex than simple procuring auctions, where the suppliers themselves 
offer a full solution to the procurer. In composite services, this is not the case, as a flawless service 
execution and therefore the requester's valuation highly depends on the accurate sequence of its 
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functional parts, meaning that in contrary to service bundles, composite services only generate 
value through a valid order of their components. 
 
3. Abstract Model & Mechanism Design 
 
The abstract model is a formalization of a service value network containing a service requester, 
service providers and service offers. It captures the networks characteristics using a formal 
notation. The model comprehends an auction-based mechanism design to allocate service providers 
within the network and to determine prices for complex services. 
 
3.1. Service Value Network 
 
A Service Value Network is represented by an k -partite, directed and acyclic graph ( , )G V E= . 
Each partition 1, , Ky yK  of the graph represents a functionality cluster that entails services that 
provide the same functionality. The topology information is public knowledge. The set of N  nodes 
1{ , , }NV v v= K  represents the set of Service Offers with v  is an arbitrary service offer. Services are 
offered by a set of Q  Service Providers 1{ , , }QS s s= K  with s  is an arbitrary service provider.  
 
Figure 1 Service Value Network Model 
 
The ownership information : S Vσ →  that reveals which service provider owns which service 
within the network is public knowledge. There are two designated nodes sv  and fv  that stand for 
source and sink in the network. The set of M  edges 1{ , , }ME e e= K  denotes service invocations 
such that ije  represents an invocation of service j  by service i . A service configuration jA  of 
service j  is fully characterized by a set of attributes 1{ , , }Lj j jA a a= K  where 
l
ja  is an attribute value 
of attribute type l  of service j 's configuration. Let furthermore ( )ij jc A  denote a cost function that 
maps service j 's configuration to corresponding costs that occur for invocation by service i  such 
that :c A R→ .  Let F  denote the set of all feasible paths from source to sink. Every f F∈  
represents a possible instantiation of the complex service. iF−  represents the set of all feasible paths 
from source to sink without node i  and its incoming and outgoing edges. Let iF  be the set of all 
feasible paths from source to sink that entail node i  such that i iF F F−= ∩ . For illustration 
purpose, Figure  shows a formalization of a Service Value Network with service offers 
1 4{ , , }V v v= K . Every feasible path from source to sink represents a possible realization of the 
overall complex service. 
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3.2. Mechanism Design 
 
The goal of the service requester is to maximize her utility U . Therefore she has to solve the 
problem of allocating a path *f  within the complex service network that yields the highest overall 
utility. Let fU  denote the overall utility of path f . 
(1) argma:  x f F fo ∈= U  
Let *U  denote the utility of the winning path meaning the utility of a path *f  that maximizes the 
requesters utility U . Let *s−U  denote the utility of a path 
*
sf−  that yields a maximum utility for the 
service requester in the reduced graph without every service owned by service provider s  and its 
incoming and outgoing edges. 
Every service provider s  receives a payment or transfer *( ), ( ), ij
s s
ji j j s e f
t t
τ σ∈ ∈ ∈
=∑  for all services she 
owns which are on the winning path. A payment sjt  for service j  corresponds to the monetary 
equivalent of the utility gap juΔ  between the winning path and second best path. In other words a 
monetary equivalent to the utility service j  contributes to the overall utility of the complex service. 
This monetary equivalent represents the price that service provider s  could have charged without 
losing her participation in the winning allocation.  
(2) * *(: )sj ij st p −= + −U U  
Consequently the payment function st  for service provider s  is defined as 
(3) 
* *
( ) ( )









⎧ + − ∈⎪= ⎨
⎪⎩
∑ ∑ U U
 
Costs sc  that service provider s  has to bear for performing offered and allocated services result 
accordingly:     
(4) ( ) ( )
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3.3. Bidding Language 
 
As a formalization of information objects which are exchanged during auction conduction we 
introduce a bidding language for requesters and providers. Our formalization assures compliance 
with the WS-Agreement specification in order to enable realization in decentralized environments 
such as the Web. A service requester wants to purchase a complex service f  which is 
characterized by a configuration fA . The importance of certain attributes and prices of a requested 
complex service is idiosyncratic and depends on the preferences of the requester. The requester's 
preferences are represented by a utility function U  of the form: 
 
(5) ( )( , , , )f f fSα αΛ = −U A P A T  
fT  denotes the sum of all transfer payments the requester has to transact to service providers that 






= ∑T . The configuration fA  of the complex 
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service is the aggregation of all attribute values of contributing services on the path f  such that 
1( , , )Lf f f= KA A A  with ij
l l
f e f ja∈= ⊕A . The aggregation of attributes values depends on their type 
(i.e. encryption can be aggregated by an AND operator whereas response time is aggregated by a 








⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑A A  represents the requester’s valuation for a 
configuration fA of the complex service represented by path f . The scoring rule is specified by a 





=∑  that defines the requester’s preferences of each 
attribute type.  To assure comparability of attribute values from different attribute types the 
aggregated attribute values lfA are mapped on an interval [0;1] . fT  represents the overall  price of 
the complex service. α  can be interpreted as the willingness to pay for a optimal configuration 
( ) 1fS =A  based on the requester’s score. In other words α  defines the substitution rate between 
configuration and price based on the requester’s preferences. 
 
Definition 1. MULTIATTRIBUTE SERVICE REQUEST 
A request for a complex service is a triple of the form 
 
(6) : ( , , , , )R G F α= Λ Γ  
with G  represents a complex service network, F  represents all feasible paths from source to 
sink that form a possible instantiation of a complex service, Λ the requester’s preferences 
and α the willingness to pay. Γ  denotes the set of lower and upper boundaries for each 
attribute type. 
 
A service offer consists of an announced service configuration jA  and a corresponding price bid 
ijp  that a service provider wants to charge for service j  being invoked depending on the 
predecessor service i  such that ( ) ( , )ij ij j ijb e A p=  is a service offer bid for invocation of service j  
which interoperable with a predecessor service i  with :b E A R→ × . A service provider s  bids for 
all incoming edges to every service she owns. 
 
Definition 2. MULTIATTRIBUTE SERVICE OFFER 
A multiattribute service offer is a set of bids of the form 
 
(7) 
( ) ( , ), ( ), ( )
:
0, otherwise
ij ij j ijs b e A p i j j sB




with ( )vτ  denotes the set of all predecessor services to service v  with :V Vτ →  and ( )sσ  
the set of all services owned by service provider s . 
 
4. Strategic Alternatives 
 
The proposed mechanism is incentive compatible for a one shot, i.e. it is a weak dominant strategy 
to bid the true cost. We assume that participants cannot communicate directly in a non-iterated 
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game. In contrast, the iterated game gives participants the opportunity to tacitly collude through 
their bidding behavior. Consider the following cases:  
 
1. All service providers (SP) submit bids at 10% above their true cost. The allocation remains the 
same but the SPs receive a higher payment since the claimed costs are higher and the individual 
utility surplus remains equal. As such, at least the allocated SP wished that everyone submits 
higher bids.  
2. For those SP that are not allocated it is beneficial to submit bids at their true cost in order to 
produce a higher utility, and as such, increase the likelihood of being allocated.  
3. Let SP i being allocated at true cost and let SP i be the only SP submitting a bid above its true 
valuation. Due to the higher costs the utility the SP generates decreases and as such the 
likelihood of being allocated also decreases. If SP i is allocated anyway the payment decreases 
due to the smaller difference of the utility surplus. As such, it is not beneficial for SP i to submit 
cost above the true valuation. The situation changes if other SPs also submit cost above the true 
valuation since the utility difference might increase. In that case submitting higher costs can be 
beneficial. 
4. Let SP i submit bid at true valuation and being allocated. Let SP j submit bids above the true 
valuation and being part of the second best allocation possibility. This bidding behavior will 
lead to a higher payment for SP i. As such, SP i prefers other SPs to submit bids above their true 
cost. 
 
We investigate this strategic decision problem by means of simple agent-based simulations. 
Inspired by the work of [14] we implement two simple strategies, probe-and-adjust (PA) and 
adjust-dependent-on-own-and-cluster-return (AOCR). Both strategies are reactive and do not 





Each SP has four action alternatives. She can either bid the true cost or increase the bid up to four 
times by discrete steps at 0.03 currency units. In total each SP has five bid alternatives, true cost or 
true cost + i times 0.03 and {i=1,.., 4}.  
 
4.1.1 Probe and Adjust (PA) 
 
The first reactive strategy is called Probe-and-Adjust. Those SP which are allocated increase the 
bid at one discrete step as long as they drop of the best path or they reach the upper cost limit (true 
cost + 0.12 currency units). All SP which are not allocated decrease the bid by one discrete cost 
step until they are either allocated or they bid their true cost.  
 
4.1.2 Adjust Dependent on Own and Cluster Return (AOCR) 
 
The second reactive strategy considers not only the individual return but also the market returns of 
the direct competitors in the same functional cluster. The aim is to maximize cluster return but not 
on own cost, i.e. we identify four cases, (1) actual cluster return is greater than the one the round 
earlier and SP i (a) is allocated and (b) SP is not allocated, as well as (2) the cluster payment is 
equal or lower than the one the round earlier and SP i (a) is allocated and (b) is not allocated 
respectively. Dependent on the described situation the SP take the following actions: (1a) SP i 
increases her bid by one discrete step, (1b) SP i does not change her bid, (2a) SP i does not change 




4.2 Hypothesis development 
 
We study the results of strategic behavior under two competitive situations, price competition (PC) 
and quality competition (QC). In the price competition scenario all SP of one cluster offer their 
services at the same quality level but different price levels, i.e. the true costs of the SP differ 
slightly. Since competition takes place not only on prices but also on quality the offered services 
differ additionally in quality of one service attribute in the quality competition scenario. Let all SP 
in the network follow the PA strategy in the PC scenario we expect that prices will reach the true 
valuation equilibrium (when all SP bid their true valuation). In contrast, we expect prices to reach a 
level between the true valuation equilibrium and the high bid equilibrium (when all SP submit bids 
at the highest possible level) while all SP follow the AOCR strategy in the PC scenario. We expect 
a different picture for the QC scenario. Since the quality level largely impacts the service 
requesters’ utility we expect that SP can exploit their competitive advantage by submitting higher 
bids which will lead to higher payments on average. Thus, we derive the following hypothesis: 
 
• H1: In the PC scenario with only PA strategies payments will converge to the true valuation 
equilibrium 
• H2: In the PC scenario with only PA strategies the deviation from the weak dominant 
strategy will be low, i.e. submitting the true valuation is the most frequently chosen 
strategy. 
• H3: In the QC scenario the diversification on the basis of service quality decreases 
competition, and as such, will lead to a higher number of deviators from the weak 
dominant strategy (truth telling). 
• H4: In the QC scenario the deviation from truth telling leads to higher payments for 
allocated SP. 
• H5: AOCR strategy leads to higher payments of the allocated services compared to the PA 
strategy. 
 
4.3 Simulation Model 
 
We apply a simulation approach to study these questions. We model the problem as a n-person 
game in which each node represents a service offer. We assume that SPs only own a single service. 
As such, we use the terms node and SP synonymously. Each SP follows one of the reactive 
strategies which it is assigned at the beginning of the simulation run. Thus, in each period 
{1, , }t T∈ K each node i  observes the own payoff r as well as the payoff r* of the best node in the 
cluster. The payoff r  resulting from the action chosen is dependent on the topology of the network, 
the service requests, the offers of all nodes (including functionality and price). Regarding one 
topology all these factors are stochastic. As such, the node’s action decision does not solely control 
the payoff. Thus, the decision problem of the nodes is comparable to an n-armed bandit problem. 
After having decided on an action, the best path is computed as well as the payoffs for all nodes on 
the path. The first action is chosen arbitrarily.  
 
4.4 Simulation Settings 
 
We conduct simulations with 20N =  nodes in 4 arbitrary chosen topologies with 5 functionality 
clusters and a density of 0.8 . This results in 20 simulation runs. Each simulation run has T=50 
periods. The cost per link are drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval [0.5, 0.7] and 
assigned for each simulation run. Attribute values for response time ( [0;1]∈ ) and encryption 
( [0;1]∈ ) are assigned at a fix value of 0.5. Link costs and attribute values stay fix over all 
simulation periods but SP can decide to submit bids above their true cost. The service requester’s 
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preferences are also fixed for each of the simulation periods in a way that he weights attribute 
values and price equally. Furthermore total path prices, and consequently, overall path utilities are 
normalized to the interval [0;1] . We run simulations for four different scenarios: (1) all nodes offer 
the same service levels and use the PA strategy (PC-PA), (2) all nodes use PA but offer different 
service levels for the attribute “response time” (QC-PA), (3) all nodes follow the AOCR-strategy 
and offer the same service levels (PC-AOCR), and (4) the nodes offer different service levels for 
the attribute “response time” and all follow the AOCR-strategy (QC-AOCR). 
 
4.5 Results and Assessment 
 
First, we analyze descriptive parameters. Table 1 displays the average values of the sum of 
payments to the SP in the network. We compare the total-network payments for all SP submitting 
their true valuation and compare it to the total-network payments achieved by the SP which were 
also allowed to deviate from the true valuation. The received surplus (achieved payoffs – true 
valuation payoffs) is positive in all four scenarios which supports our assumption that collusion 
might be beneficial. Additionally, we observe that the total surplus is lower in the AOCR scenarios 
compared to PA scenarios. Besides the total networks payoffs it is also important to study the 
individual payments especially of those SP who would be allocated while playing the true 
valuation. Table 2 displays the average individual payoffs as well as the average individual payoff 
while playing the true valuation strategy. 
Table 1 Aggregated Payments of all SPs in the Network 
 PA-PC PA-QC AOCR-PC AOCR-QC 
mean payments total-network (truth-telling) 2,899 3,166 2,899 3,166 
mean payments total-network (achieved) 2,971 3,309 2,943 3,203 
mean surplus total-network (achieved) 0,072 0,142 0,043 0,037 
surplus (%) 2,48% 4,49% 1,49% 1,16% 
 
 
Figure 1 Development of Aggregated SP Payments (PA-PC Setting) 
 
Table 2 Individual Payoffs of Thruth-Telling SPs 
 PA-PC PA-QC AOCR-PC AOCR-QC 
mean payments per allocated SP (true valuation) 0,580 0,633 0,580 0,633 
mean payments allocated SP (achieved) 0,570 0,642 0,593 0,655 
mean surplus allocated SP (achieved) -0,009 0,009 0,014 0,022 
surplus (%) -1,60% 1,44% 2,35% 3,40% 
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The comparison of the average individual payoffs draws a different picture compared to the 
comparison of the aggregated payoffs. Following the PA-strategy in a price competition 
environment even leads to negative payoffs. Payoffs are larger for the AOCR-strategy. We also 
observe that the quality competition leads to higher individual payments on average compared to 
the price competition scenarios regardless of the strategy chosen. Unfortunately, the performed t-
tests do not support this observation on a significant level. Consequently, we do not find significant 
support for Hypothesis H5. In contrast, we find support for Hypothesis H1 since the t-test does not 
support significant difference of the true-valuation payments and the PA-PC payments. Regarding 
H4 stating that it is beneficial in the AOCR-QC scenario to deviate from truth telling for those SP 
that would be allocated while submitting their true cost, we perform a single sided t-test and find 
significant support on a level of p 0.02= . Figure 2 shows exemplarily the course of one simulation 
run in the PA-PC setting. The payment sum converges already after a few repetitions close to the 
true-valuation-equilibrium as expected. We observe similar results in the simulation runs of the 
same setting with different network topologies. This additionally supports H1. 
 
 
Figure 2 Frequency of Successful Actions Chosen by Allocated SPs 
 
Regarding Hypothesis H2 and H3, we investigate both, the frequency of actions taken by all SP 
(incl. those SP that are not allocated) as well as the frequency of actions taken by the successful 
SPs. Figure 3 display the frequency of successful actions. Comparing the frequency of submitting 
true cost in the PA-PC vs. PA-QC we observe a decrease in the number of successful truth tellers. 
Unfortunately, we do not find significant statistical support since the t-test produces a p-value of 




In the present paper we describe that the fundamental change from a product-oriented to a service-
oriented economy fosters the formation of service value networks. Service providers offer their 
services within these networks. Service requesters combine different service offers to complex 
services best matching their preferences. The main question in service value networks is how to 
efficiently match service offers and complex service requests and dynamically determine prices. 
We propose an auction-based approach as a central allocation mechanism for multi-attribute 
services. Therefore, we introduce a formal model for service value networks as a k-partite, directed 
and acyclic graph, we specify the bidding language to define service offers and service requests, 
and we introduce the incentive compatible auction mechanism. In a repeated game incentive 
compatibility does not hold. We study two simple strategies to collude by means of an agent-based 
simulation approach. The simulation results show that deviating from truth telling might be 
607
beneficial especially for those SP who are in the allocation. The payments of SP can increase 
especially if the service quality offers are diverse and as such the difference in prices does not play 
a such important role as in a price competition regime. We are aware that the results are based on a 
simple model with relatively strict assumptions. We have just studied two simple strategies, but 
there certainly exist a couple of more sophisticated strategic alternatives. Additionally, we did not 
take varying preferences of service requesters into account. As such, the results are model-specific 
and a generalization is to be proven with additional simulations based on real-world data. During 
the model development a couple of ideas for future work came up. The most interesting aspect is to 
introduce additional strategies and also to study mixed strategy settings. We are also interested in 
using a learning mechanism in order to discover additional strategies. In the present model and 
simulation we have studied one proposed mechanism which we want to compare to alternative 
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